Hill-Burton Enforcement: A Proposed Remedy to Cure Hospital Inertia;Note by Lochner, Paul D.
Journal of Legislation
Volume 14 | Issue 1 Article 5
1-1-1987
Hill-Burton Enforcement: A Proposed Remedy to
Cure Hospital Inertia;Note
Paul D. Lochner
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/jleg
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journal of Legislation at NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of
Legislation by an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Lochner, Paul D. (1987) "Hill-Burton Enforcement: A Proposed Remedy to Cure Hospital Inertia;Note," Journal of Legislation: Vol.
14: Iss. 1, Article 5.
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/jleg/vol14/iss1/5
HILL-BURTON ENFORCEMENT:
A PROPOSED REMEDY
TO CURE HOSPITAL INERTIA
INTRODUCTION
The concern for adequate health care for all is not a new phenom-
enon. In 1946, in response to the need for more health care facilities,
Congress passed the Hospital Survey and Construction Act,' commonly
known as the Hill-Burton Act. 2 The Act authorized grants with which
states survey their hospitals and public health centers and plan construc-
tion of additional facilities.3 The Act's primary purpose was to facilitate
construction, 4 but Congress added a provision requiring hospitals to
provide a reasonable volume of hospital services to indigents.5 The
provision lay dormant for 20 years and was rarely enforced. 6 In the
1970s, however, a rash of litigation to enforce the free health care
provision led the Department of Health, Education and Welfare to
issue regulations governing the provision. 7 These regulations came as a
reaction to judicial interpretation of the Act and defined its compliance
provisions. Critics view the regulations as being beyond the scope of
the Act and as having converted Hill-Burton into an ,alternative source
of Medicaid.' Critics also argue the regulations are unconstitutional. 9
1. Title VI of the Act of August 13, 1946, ch. 958 § 2, 60 Stat. 1041. The statute, as amended,
is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 291-291(o) (1982).
2. The Hill-Burton Act is named after its two principal sponsors, Sen. Lister Hill (D-Ala.) and
Sen. Harold H. Burton (R-Ohio).
3. The purpose of the Act is
[t]o assist the states in making a careful State-wide survey of the hospitals and health
facilities in the State in order to determine where additional facilities are needed and
to prepare a State-wide program for new construction so that all people of the state
may have adequate health and hospital service.
Hospital Construction Act: Hearings on S. 191 Before the Senate Comm. on Education and
Labor, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1945) (statement of Sen. Hill) [hereinafter cited as 1945 Hearings].
4. See id.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 291(c)(e) (1982) provides that
[t]he State plan shall provide for adequate hospitals, and other facilities for which aid
under this part is available, for all persons residing in the State, and adequate hospitals
(and such other facilities) to furnish needed services for persons unable to pay therefore.
Such regulations may also require that ... (2) there will be made available in the
facility or portion thereof to be constructed or modernized a reasonable volume of
services to persons unable to pay therefore, but an exception shall be made if such a
requirement is not feasible from a financial viewpoint.
6. See infra note 39 and accompanying text.
7. 42 C.F.R. §§ 53.111-.113, 124.501-513 (1986).
8. See, e.g., Note, Due Process for Hill-Burton Assisted Facilities, 32 VAND. L. REv. 1469,
1474 (1979) (author argues that the expansive nature of the regulations promulgated by
Health and Human Services to clarify the Hill-Burton assurances has transformed the Act
into an alternative source of Medicaid).
9. See generally id.; Blumstein, Court Action, Agency Reaction: The Hill-Burton Act as a Case
Study, 69 IowA L. REV. 1227 (1984). Professor Blumstein argues that the principles of
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This note suggests that the regulations were necessary to enforce
the conditions to which the hospitals agreed in exchange for federal
funding. The note discusses the need for health care for the indigent,
examines the Hill-Burton Act, and shows that uncompensated health
care to the indigent was an important concern of Congress in enacting
Hill-Burton. It then looks at the effect of Hill-Burton as originally
passed, the hospitals' failure to provide free health care and the judicial
activism that led to the 1972 and 1979 regulations. Finally, it analyzes
the constitutional objections to the amendments, looks at the proposed
rules recently suggested by the Department of Health and Human
Services, and proposes further regulation to compel hospital compliance.
THE NEED FOR FREE HEALTH CARE
Today, hospital bills can amount to thousands of dollars. 0 Annual
per-capita spending on medical care in the United States exceeds $1,000."
Of the $371 billion spent in the U.S. in 1985,12 public sources provided
forty cents of every dollar, 13 and all third parties combined financed
92 percent of hospital care services.' 4
The exorbitant cost of health care most adversely affects the
indigent. Those who do not work cannot participate in group employ-
ment policies, which feature relatively low premium rates. 5 Insurance
has increased access to care and provides treatment of patients who
fairness for federal grantees announced in Pennhurst v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981) (see
infra notes 87-95 and accompanying text) would seem to apply to constrain agency rulemaking
discretion, especially when, as in the Hill-Burton context, agency discretion was exercised
only in response to criticism by federal district judges. Blumstein also argues that the changes
in the provisions of the Hill-Burton regulations go far beyond anything reasonably foreseeable
by the grantee hospitals. Id. at 1259.
10. The average cost per patient day in 1983 was $369, while the average cost per patient stay
was $2,789. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1986, at 109 (106th ed. 1985).
11. Health expenditures amounted to $1,721 per person in 1985, with 59 percent coming from
the private sector, mostly through private health insurance and from consumers and their
families. The remaining 41 percent was funded through government programs, principally
Medicare and Medicaid. See Levit, Lazenby & Waldo, National Health Expenditures, 1985,
8 HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV. 1 (1986) [hereinafter cited as National Health Expenditures].
12. The amount spent on health care in 1985 equalled 10.7 percent of the Gross National
Product. Id. at 8.
13. Federal payments amounted to $124.4 billion, and $50.4 billion came from state and local
governments. Public programs financed 39.7 percent of all personal health care expenditures,
including 53.8 percent of all hospital care, 29.1 percent of all physician services, and 46.9
percent of all nursing home care. See id. at 13-17.
14. All third parties combined-private health insurers, government, private charities and indus-
tries-financed 71.6 percent of the $371.4 billion spent for personal health care in 1985,
covering 90.7 percent of hospital care services, 73.7 percent of physicians' services, and 42.1
percent of the remainder, which consists of those personal health care expenditures other
than those for hospital care, physicians' services and nursing home care. See id. at 16-18.
15. See K. DAVIS & C. SCHOEN, HEALTH AND THE WAR ON POVERTY: A TEN-YEAR APPRAISAL 9
(1978) (group insurance policies provided by employers have lowered premiums and increased
access to insurance for those in lower income brackets, but many indigents have no jobs,
and thus do not have this access to low-cost insurance).
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had been shut out of the medical market. 16 Private insurance companies,
however, are reluctant to write comprehensive health insurance policies
for the poor, who, because of their multiple health problems, are
considered a bad risk.17 Even for those who can afford it, the typical
medical insurance policy provides only limited coverage. 1"
Since Medicare and Medicaid came into being in 1966,' 9 access to
medical care for the people eligible to receive it has markedly im-
proved.20 Eligibility standards for Medicaid, however, exclude a great
number of people.2 1 Because of Medicaid's multiple criteria for eligi-
bility, about 12 million people with income below the federal poverty
16. Unlike other goods or services for which the consumer pays the provider directly, health
care payments are often handled by a financial agent, a third party. Insurance has increased
access to care, resulting in the increase of care for those who usually could not afford it.
See Gibson, Levit, Lazenby & Waldo, National Health Expenditures, 1983, 6 HEALTH CARE
FINANCING REV. 11 (1984).
17. The poor bear many social costs imposed upon them by a negligent society. These result in
poor health, which the indigent are largely unable to avoid. The poor suffer from the high
risks of injury, sickness, or poor health they incur in risky and physically demanding jobs
or through industrial pollution and waste in the communities in which they live. Additionally,
poor health prevents the disadvantaged from competing equally in the marketplace. Oftentimes
the disadvantaged are handicapped from birth, off to a slow start because of inadequate
care and nutrition during pregnancy. Poor health care during childhood and adulthood is
recognized as causing a rapid loss of functional ability, and this loss becomes even more
apparent as people move into middle and old age. Because of the poor health from which
the indigent suffer, insurance policies for the poor are usually limited in benefits and require
the payment of a premium far in excess of the expected benefits. Often riders attached to
policies give companies the option of dropping coverage should the beneficiary become a
poor risk. For the disabled poor or those with obviously identifiable poor health, companies
are unwilling to provide any coverage at all. K. DAvIs & C. SCHOEN, supra note 15, at 8-
10.
18. For an informative discussion of the nature and extent of private health insurance coverage,
See A. SCHNEDER, AN ADVOCATE'S GUIDE To HEALTH CARE FINANCING 138-83 (1980).
19. Medicare is the popular name for Title XVIII of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-
1395pp (Supp. 1975). It was enacted as part of the Social Security Amendments of 1965 to
provide health care benefits to eligible aged persons, and became effective on July 1, 1966.
Medicaid is the popular name for Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
1396-1396i (1974). Like Medicare, Medicaid was enacted as part of the Social Security
Amendments of 1965 to provide health care benefits to eligible low-income and lower-middle-
income persons.
20. In 1964, poor people (family income under $2,000) had the lowest rate of physician visits.
Poor people (family income less than $5,000 in 1976 and less than $7,000 in 1981) had the
highest rate of physician visits in those years. The hospital discharge rate among the poor
increased, while rates for other income groups fell. These trends may be attributed in large
part to a variety of federal programs, including Medicaid, which have improved the access
of the poor to physicians and hospitals. ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PR.ESIDENT, H.R. Doc.
No. 19, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 135-36 (1985) [hereinafter cited as ECONOMIC REPORT].
21. Because of the complex restrictions, Medicaid excludes widows and other single persons
under 65 and childless couples; most two-parent families (which constitute 70 percent of the
rural poor and almost half the poor families in metropolitan areas); families with one parent
working at a marginal, low-paying job; families with an unemployed parent in the 26 states
that do not extend welfare payments to this group; unemployed parents receiving unemploy-
ment compensation in other states; medically needy families in the 22 states that do not
voluntarily provide this additional coverage; single women pregnant with their first child in
the 20 states that do not provide welfare aid or eligibility for the unborn child; and children
of poor families not receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children in the 33 states that
do not take advantage of the optional Medicaid category "All needy children under 21." K.
DAVIS & C. SCHOEN, supra note 15, at 53.
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threshold in 1980 were ineligible for Medicaid.2 2 These people must rely
on their own resources or funding provided by private charities.
For a variety of economic and non-economic reasons, many insti-
tutions will not provide government-sponsored care. 23 Discrimination
against minorities, the handicapped, welfare recipients and other groups
that are over-represented among the poor continues in medical care, as
in other aspects of American life. 24 Poor nutrition, inferior housing,
inadequate sanitation, and the physical and psychological stresses of
unemployment and deprivation combine to aggravate the health prob-
lems of the poor. 25
THE BACKDROP FOR HILL-BURTON
The end of World War II brought thousands of soldiers back to
the United States. These soldiers were accustomed to a high standard
of health care, 26 and Congress wanted to assure that this level of care
would continue to be provided in all parts of the country. 27 Concern
was centered on the sheer lack of health care facilities, especially in
rural areas. 21 It is against this backdrop that the Hill-Burton Act was
introduced.
22. At the same time, about 5 million of those eligible had an annual family income at least twice
the poverty level. It should be noted that the overwhelming emphasis of Medicaid is on
institutional care. Of $32.4 billion spent on Medicaid in fiscal 1983, hospitals received 27.2
percent for inpatient care. Payments to physicians represented only 6.7 percent of all Medicaid
payments in fiscal 1983. See ECONoMc REPORT, supra note 20, at 155.
Of the 19.3 million people covered by Medicaid in 1983, 13.2 million were below the
poverty level, and 6 million were above it. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1986, at 101 (106th ed. 1985).
23. Because Medicaid is administered by each state, there are wide variations in eligibility
requirements and in services covered. In some states, people may lose all of their eligibility
if their income level rises slightly above the cutoff level; eligibility is not graduated according
to income level. Because Medicaid costs have risen so quickly, states have been pressured to
reduce their share of the rising costs. The methods usually used have been to reduce eligibility,
reduce benefits, and reduce the amount paid to medical providers. The latter approach has,
in some places, resulted in two different kinds of medical care: one for the Medicaid patient
and the other for everyone else. Lower levels of reimbursement for Medicaid patients have
limited the willingness of many providers to serve Medicaid patients. P. FELDSTEIN, HEALTH
CARE ECONOMCS 540 (2nd ed. 1983).
24. Within the states there are variations in access to and use of services between white and
nonwhite persons and between urban and rural dwellers. See id.; see generally Institute of
Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, HEALTH CARE IN A CONTEXT OF CIVIL RIGHTS
(1981).
25. K. DAVIS & C. SCHOEN, supra note 15, at 10.
26. During the course of the hearings, Sen. Johnston noted:
We now have millions of men and women in the armed forces who, for the first time
in their lives, have had adequate hospital and medical care and it has been, I am
proud to say, the finest in the world. We cannot expect them to forget these advantages
when they return to private life, and, indeed, they will not do so. We have thousands
of young doctors now in the armed forces, soon to be returned to civilian life, whose
entire education and experience have been built around a modern hospital. They must
have a place to work if we are to have adequate medical care in this country.
91 CONG. REC. 11,732 (1945).
27. See generally 1945 Hearings, supra note 3. Concern about the lack of adequate health care
facilities around the country was the crux of the hearings.
28. See id.
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Under Hill-Burton, the Surgeon General was required to prescribe
the state plan requirements29 and assurances necessary for the approval
of hospital construction applications.30 The Act requires that hospitals
"furnish needed services for persons unable to pay therefore"'" and
also gave the Surgeon General the option to require, as a precondition
to approval, that the state give assurance that the hospitals would
provide such services.3 2 All state plans had to be approved by the
Surgeon General and the Secretary of Health and Human Services.33
To be approved, the state application had to conform with the regu-
lations promulgated under section 291c(e) of the Act.34
In 1945, the Senate Committee on Education and Labor first
discussed the Hill-Burton proposal. 5 Much of the discussion during the
hearings was devoted to caring for the indigent.3 6 These discussions are
also illustrative of the premise, assumed in 1945, that hospitals would
voluntarily provide services to all residents, including the indigent, out
of their history of charitable service.3 7 This premise proved to be
unjustified, and the failure of the hospitals to provide health care to
29. 42 U.S.C. § 291c (1982). The Surgeon General prescribes the priority of projects, the
standards of construction and equipment, the needs for beds, hospitals and other facilities,
the criteria for determining need for modernization and state plan requirements. It should
be noted that the Office of the Surgeon General was abolished by § 3 of Reorganization
Plan No. 3 of 1966, F.R. 8855, 80 Stat. 1610 (1966), and all functions thereof were
transferred to the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare by § I of Reorganization
Plan No. 3 of 1966, set out as a note under § 202 of Title 42.
30. 42 U.S.C. § 291c(e) (1982).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. 42 U.S.C. § 291e(b) provides the criteria for approval of an application for construction or
modernization, and requires that any plan be approved both by the Surgeon General and
the Secretary of Health and Human Services. Since the function of the Surgeon General was
transferred to the Secretary of Health and Human Services, this dual requirement has been
extinguished.
34. Id. This section also requires:
(3) that the application is in conformity with the State plan approved under section
291d of this title and contains an assurance that in the operation of the project there
will be compliance with the applicable requirements of the regulations prescribed under
section 291c(e) of this title, and with State standards for operation and mainte-
nance ....
35. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
36. Id. at 10 (statement of Dr. Smelzer, President of the American Hospital Association); id. at
30 (statement of Sen. Chavez); id. at 34 (discussion between Dr. Smelzer and Sen. Ellender);
id. at 177 (statement of Sen. Murray); id. at 190-91 (discussion between Sen. Ellender, Sen.
Pepper, Sen. Taft, and Dr. Mott, an official of the Department of Agriculture). This last
discussion is particularly illustrative. Sen. Pepper noted: "In determining the burden which
the hospital would be expected to carry, they might not be able to get Federal aid unless
they agreed to take a fixed number of indigent patients." Id. at 190. Sen. Taft responded
that he believed "every hospital of a general nature would be lucky if they did not have 20
percent of indigent patients." Id.
37. This assumption can be seen in Dr. Smelzer's statement: "I think if this bill will provide
the hospitals, will develop programs for the construction of such public and nonprofit
hospitals, people who get into them will be taken care of at the local level." Id. at 30. Also
indicative is Sen. Taft's comment: "You would say a hospital accepting aid of this kind
should have obligation to take care of a certain number of indigent patients. Most of them
do, but I mean if they are going to have Federal money, should there not be a definite
obligation .... " Id. at 190.
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the poor resulted in litigation to enforce the hospitals' community
service and uncompensated care obligations in the early 1970s.3s
The 1972 Regulations
The free-health-care provisions of Hill-Burton were widely unen-
forced during the first twenty-five years.3 9 Beginning in 1970, litigation
revived interest in the long-forgotten assurances. In 1972, the Depart-
ment of Health, Education and Welfare began to define the scope of
the uncompensated care assurances more clearly in light of the pending
litigation.4n
The regulations set forth a twenty-year limitation on the uncom-
pensated care requirement. 41 In addition, a presumptive compliance
guideline was given, requiring hospitals to provide services at a level
not less than the lesser of three percent of operating costs or ten percent
of all federal assistance provided under the Act.42 The hospital could
also comply by certifying that it would not exclude any person from
admission on the grounds that he could not pay, the so-called "open
door" provision. 43 Applicants had to submit compliance reports every
year,44 and if they had fallen behind in their provision of health care,
38. See, e.g., Euresti v. Stenner, 458 F.2d 1115 (10th Cir. 1972) (indigents had standing to
maintain action to enforce Hill-Burton obligations); Cook v. Ochsner Found. Hosp., 319 F.
Supp. 603 (E.D. La. 1973) (poor persons in need of health services were beneficiaries of the
legislation and had standing to sue grantees of Hill-Burton money and the state agency
charged with enforcing the obligations); Perry v. Greater Southeast Community Hosp.
Found., Civ. No. 725-71 (D.C. June 28, 1972) (plaintiffs had standing to sue Health,
Education and Welfare, the supervising agency for the District of Columbia and one Hill-
Burton hospital); OMICA v. James Archer Smith Hosp., 325 F. Supp. 268 (S.D. Fla. 1971)
(plaintiffs had standing to sue; Health, Education and Welfare determined to be an indis-
pensable party).
39. See Rose, Federal Regulation of Services to the Poor Under the Hill-Burton Act: Realities
and Pitfalls, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 168, 169 (1975).
40. See id. at 174-76.
41. 42 C.F.R. § 53.111(a) (1986) provides:
The provisions of this section apply to every applicant which heretofore has given or
hereafter will give an assurance that it will make available a reasonable volume of
services to persons unable to pay therefor but shall not apply to an applicant (1) for
more than 20 years after the completion of construction of any facility with respect
to which funds have been paid under section 606 of the Act or (2) beyond the period
during which any amount of a direct loan made under sections 610 or 623 of the Act,
or any amount of a loan with respect to which a loan guarantee and interest subsidy
has been provided under sections 623 and 624 of the Act remains unpaid.
42. 42 C.F.R. § 53.111(d)(1) (1986).
43. 42 C.F.R. § 53.111(d)(2) (1986) provides:
An applicant which, for a fiscal year . .. (2) certifies that it will not exclude any
person from admission on the ground that such person is unable to pay for needed
services and that it will make available to each person so admitted services provided
by the facility without charge or at a charge below reasonable cost which does not
exceed any such person's ability to pay therefor as determined in accordance with
criteria established pursuant to paragraph (g), shall be deemed in presumptive com-
pliance with its assurance.
44. 42 C.F.R. § 53.111(e)(1) (1986) provides:
Each applicant shall, not later than 120 days after the end of a fiscal year, unless a
longer period is approved by the State agency for good cause shown, file with the
State agency a copy of its annual statement for such year as required by section 6 of
1987] Hill-Burton Reform
had to give a justification and, if necessary, include an affirmative-
action plan to create public awareness of the availability of such
services.45 Payments by third-party insurers and Medicare and Medicaid
programs were excluded from the computation of uncompensated serv-
ices. 46 Enforcement was left primarily to the state agency, which had
to perform annual evaluations of compliance,4 7 and provide for ade-
quate methods of enforcement. 48
The Effect of Hill-Burton as Originally Passed
Viewed only as a construction bill, the Hill-Burton Act has been
a smashing success. 49 By 1974, more than $4 billion in Hill-Burton
funds had been spent on construction and modernization of medical
care facilities around the country. 0 From 1946 through 1973, the Hill-
Burton program aided more than 3,900 communities in the construction
and modernization of 6,445 public and voluntary non-profit facilities.'
In fact, Hill-Burton may have proved too successful in encouraging
the Act and § 53.128(q), which shall set forth its operating costs.
"State agency" is defined as "the agency of a State fully or conditionally designated by the
Secretary as the State health planning and development agency under section 1521 of the Act."
42 C.F.R. § 124.502 (1986).
45. 42 C.F.R. § 53.111(e)(2)(ii) (1986) provides:
If the level of services provided was less than the level of uncompensated services
established pursuant to paragraph (h) of this section, the applicant shall submit with
such statement: A justification therefor, showing that the provision of such lower
level of uncompensated services was reasonable under the circumstances; and a
description of the steps it proposes to take to assure the availability and utilization
of the level of uncompensated services to be established for the current fiscal year,
which shall include an affirmative action plan, utilizing press releases or other
appropriate means as the facility may desire to bring to the attention of the public
the availability of such uncompensated services and the conditions of eligibility
therefor.
46. 42 C.F.R. § 53.111(f)(2) (1986) provides:
There shall be excluded from the computation of uncompensated services: (i) Any
amount which the applicant has received, or is entitled to receive, from a third party
insurer or under a governmental program; and (ii) The reasonable cost of any services
for which payment in whole or in part would be available under a governmental
program (e.g., Medicare and Medicaid) in which the applicant, although eligible to
do so, does not participate, but only to the extent of such otherwise available payment.
47. 42 C.F.R. § 53.111(j)(i) (1986) provides:
The State agency shall, (i) at least annually, perform evaluations of the amount of
the various services provided in each facility with respect to which Federal assistance
has been provided under the Act, to determine whether such assurance is being
complied with; and (ii) establish procedures for the investigation of complaints that
such assurance is not being complied with.
48. 42 C.F.R. § 53.111)(3) (1986) provides:
The State plan shall provide for adequate methods of enforcement of the assurance,
including effective sanctions to be applied against any facility which fails to comply
with such assurance. Such sanctions may include, but need not be limited to, license
revocation, termination of State assistance, and court action.
49. S. REP. No. 1285, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws
7842.
50. 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADrNN. NEws 7842, 7861 (appropriations increased from $75
million in 1948 to $197.2 million in 1974, peaking in 1967 at $270 million).
51. Id. at 7862.
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hospital construction-as early as 1974, some experts believed that there
was a surplus of hospital beds in the United States.5 2
Although Hill-Burton has succeeded in increasing hospital facilities,
it has failed to significantly increase health services to the poor. While
readily accepting construction funds, the compliance records of the
hospitals receiving Hill-Burton funds have been less than satisfactory.
Even after twenty-seven years, the implementation of the free-service
requirements was in its infancy at the state level. 3 No state agencies
had an active program for monitoring compliance, but rather intended
to rely on complaints to do so.54 The assumption that hospitals would
provide free health care based on their history of charitable care proved
to be unjustified."
Judicial Interpretation of Hill-Burton
Litigation continued after 1972 in order to enforce the newly
promulgated regulations. In Corum v. Beth Israel Medical Center,16 a
federal district court invalidated a regulation allowing hospitals to credit
toward their Hill-Burton obligations care that was rendered to patients
whose Hill-Burton eligibility was not determined until after the patients
were billed. Of major concern to the court was the problem that after-
the-fact determination discouraged many poor, potential beneficiaries
from seeking medical assistance, due to the uncertainty of their status.5 7
The court concluded that the discouraging influence of the provision
was antithetical to the goals of the Act."
A crucial decision regarding plaintiffs' rights was Newsom v.
Vanderbilt University.5 9 The district court recognized a constitutionally
protected property right of each indigent patient "to needed uncom-
52. The Act by this point had enabled construction of a sufficient number of hospitals to satisfy
the needs of the community. The emphasis of most state Hill-Burton plans was shifted to
the maintenance of these facilities through loans and grants for modernization. Id. at 7966.
53. Id. at 7900.
54. This was characterized by the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare as a "sorry
performance by the Department and the State Hill-Burton agencies in implementing a
provision which has been in law for over 20 years." Id.
55. See American Hosp. Ass'n v. Schweiker, 721 F.2d 170, 177 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
466 U.S. 958 (1984). The court, in discussing the 1945 Hearings, found that there was a
contemporary assumption that hospitals would voluntarily provide charitable services at little
or no cost to the poor. It is also noted that the hospitals' compliance with the assurances
later inserted into the bill may have been taken for granted once the federal government
enabled them to construct facilities.
56. 373 F. Supp. 550 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
57. The court noted:
If a hospital is not obliged to make a determination of indigency prior to the rendition
of services, many truly indigent persons may incur liabilities to it in the hope of
qualifying for free or below cost services, which they will later be hard pressed to
pay if the hospital declines to treat them as beneficiaries of its Hill-Burton assurance
on the ground that by the time of billing its requirement has been satisfied.
Id. at 557.
58. Id.
59. 453 F. Supp. 401 (M.D. Tenn. 1978), aff'd in part, modified in part, and rev'd in part, 653
F.2d 1100 (6th Cii. 1981).
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pensated services under the Hill-Burton Act." 6 The court further held
that the hospital had denied the patient procedural due process.6 I The
court held that due process required individual notice by the hospital
of the availability of free Hill-Burton care, plus written eligibility criteria
for the allocation of the care.6 2 Any individual denied Hill-Burton care
had to receive "timely and adequate written notice detailing the reasons
for the proposed denial of benefits, review by a decision-maker who
[had] not participated in making the initial finding of ineligibility, and
a written statement of the reasons for the decision and the evidence
relied on."'63 The court of appeals later reversed the ruling that each
individual indigent plaintiff had a right to services.64 By the time it was
reversed, however, the district court decision had already helped to
prompt the Secretary of Health and Human Services to promulgate the
1979 regulations.
The courts in these cases accepted the argument advanced on behalf
of indigents that the focus of the program should be on individual
patients.6 1 Indeed, the Corum court, in stating that it would be anti-
thetical to the goals of Hill-Burton to discourage potential patients from
seeking free health care, impliedly assumed that the uncompensated
health care provisions of the Act were of central importance. 6
The rulings in Corum and Newsom were judicial reactions to the
reluctance of the hospitals to fulfill even the minimal requirements as
set forth in the original Act. Were it not for the almost complete lack
of compliance, these cases may never have reached the courts.6 7 The
60. The court noted that "the Act itself defines persons entitled to uncompensated care as being
those 'unable to pay therefor,' a statutory standard of eligibility which the plaintiff class,
by definition, meets." 453 F.Supp. at 423.
61. Id. at 422-23 (citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)).
62. 453 F. Supp. at 424.
63. Id.
64. The court of appeals held that "although the class may have a right to have the hospital
give benefits to some of the class members and thus has standing under the statute, no
individual has a legitimate claim to free services such that the procedures provided in the
present case infringe a due process right." 653 F.2d at 1121.
65. This proposition can be seen in several early cases. In Euresti v. Stenner, 458 F.2d 1115
(10th Cir. 1972), the court held that "the legislative history and the expressed purposes of
Congress indicate that the Act was passed to ensure that the indigent would be supplied
sufficient hospital services when needed." Id. at 1118. The district court in Newsom v.
Vanderbilt Univ., 453 F. Supp. 401 (M.D. Tenn. 1978) noted that "[T]he inclusion of the
free care provisions . . . makes it plain that one of the needs Congress felt to be unmet in
1946, and still inadequately met in 1974, was the need for medical care for the indigent."
Id. at 422, n. 15. The court in Cook v. Ochsner Found. Hosp., 319 F. Supp. 603 (E.D. La.
1973), found that it was not even necessary to delve into the legislative history of the Act,
and that
[tihe Act, by its own terms, makes it plain that persons unable to pay for medical
services are one of the chief sets of beneficiaries of this legislation. It is a matter of
the clearest logic that the only real beneficiaries of a hospital program are the people
who need or may need medical treatment. This includes people of all classes, whether
rich or poor.
Id. at 606.
66. See 373 F. Supp. at 555, 557.
67. As the court in American Hosp. Ass'n v. Schweiker, 721 F.2d 170 (7th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 466 U.S. 958 (1984) noted, "although over $4.4 billion in grants and $2 billion in
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failure of hospitals to provide care for the indigent resulted in litigation
to enforce the federally assisted hospitals' community service and un-
compensated health care obligations under Hill-Burton. 68 It appears that
the hospitals have no one to blame but their administrators. The courts
were not seeking to transform Hill-Burton; they were merely trying to
force the hospitals to furnish that which they had promised in return
for Hill-Burton funds.
The 1979 Regulations
In response to pressure by those seeking better enforcement of
compliance guidelines, Health and Human Services69 proposed new
regulations in 1978. The regulations represent an extensive revision of
the uncompensated care and community-service assurances of Hill-
Burton. They reflect a developing realization that Congress intended
not only to aid construction, but also to aid people in the community.
The 1979 regulations retain a quantitative measure of compliance. A
hospital may fulfill its uncompensated-care assurance by furnishing care
to qualified patients amounting to three percent of its annual operating
costs70 or by providing care amounting to ten percent of the annual
Hill-Burton financial assistance received by the hospital. 71 The open-
door treatment option was eliminated. 72 The basis for establishing the
loans and loan guarantees were authorized between 1947 and 1974 . . .the hospitals receiving
aid displayed a marked reluctance to give even the most token charitable care." 721 F.2d at
173.
68. The court stated: "After-and apparently in response to-a series of lawsuits brought by
several private citizens and public interest groups against federally assisted hospitals to enforce
compliance with the Hill-Burton obligations .. . the Secretary began in 1972 to issue
regulations which defined standards for compliance with the assurances." Id.
69. Health and Human Services is the successor to Health, Education and Welfare. 20 U.S.C.
§ 3508 (1982).
70. 42 C.F.R. § 124.503(a)(1)(i) (1986) provides:
A facility is in compliance with its assurance to provide a reasonable volume of
services to persons unable to pay if it provides for the fiscal year uncompensated
services at a level not less than the lesser of: (i) Three percent of its operating costs
for the most recent fiscal year for which an audited financial statement is available;
• ..adjusted by a percentage equal to the percentage change in the national Consumer
Price Index for medical care between the year in which the facility received assistance
or 1979, whichever is later, and the most recent year for which a published Index is
available.
71. 42 C.F.R. § 124.503(a)(1)(ii) (1986) adds:
A facility is in compliance with its assurance to provide a reasonable volume of
services to persons unable to pay if it provides for the fiscal year uncompensated
services at a level not less than the lesser of: . . . (ii) Ten percent of all Federal
assistance provided to or on behalf of the facility, adjusted by a percentage equal to
the percentage change in the national Consumer Price Index for medical care between
the year in which the facility received assistance or 1979, whichever is later, and the
most recent year for which a published Index is available.
72. See 44 Fed. Reg. 29,372, 29,385 (1979). Health and Human Services explained:
The Department continues to believe that elimination of the open door option is
necessary for the reasons stated in the preamble to the proposed rules and by many
consumers. A clear dollar standard against which facility performance can be measured
will simplify monitoring and administration, gain public confidence that a "reasonable
volume" of services has in fact been made available, and will result in facilities
shouldering relatively equal minimum obligations to serve the medically indigent.
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appropriate level of free care is adjusted upward annually in accordance
with the Consumer Price Index for medical care. 73 Shortfalls in any
year must be added to future years' obligation, beyond the twenty-year
obligation, and adjusted for inflation. 74
THE FAILURE OF FREE HEALTH CARE
UNDER HILL-BURTON: A CASE STUDY
Despite the protests of hospitals and commentators, hospitals do
not substantially comply with the free-health-care provisions of the Act.
Even since the promulgation of the 1979 regulations, there has been
substantial noncompliance. A 1981 study of twenty-one Hill-Burton
facilities in North Dakota is illustrative of this point. 75 Only one facility
fully complied with the requirements. 76 Fourteen sites had incurred a
Hill-Burton deficit in 1980. 77 Of these fourteen, nine failed to file a
report with the Secretary of Health and Human Services as required
by the regulations. 78 Of the five that did submit a report, two were
inaccurate. 79 All of this adds up to a great loss of health care for the
poor. The correction of Hill-Burton crediting and compliance level
errors at only eleven of the facilities meant that these facilities would
have to provide $63,478 more in Hill-Burton care in 1982.0 The margin
73. See supra notes 70-71.
74. 42 C.F.R. § 124.503(b) (1986) provides:
If in any fiscal year a facility assisted under Title VI of the Act fails to meet its
annual compliance level, it shall provide uncompensated services in an amount suffi-
cient to make up that deficit (as adjusted under paragraph (d)). The facility may make
up a deficit at any time during its period of obligation or in the year or years (if
necessary) immediately following, except where the facility failed to provide uncom-
pensated services at the required level although financially able to do so, or where
the facility did not comply with the requirements of this subpart.
Section (d)(2) additionally provides:
The amount of any deficit the facility makes up, and the amount of any excess
compliance applied to reduce a facility's annual compliance level, must be adjusted
by a percentage equal to the percentage change in the National Consumer Price Index
for medical care between the fiscal year in which the facility had a deficit or provided
the excess, and the fiscal year in which the facility makes up the deficit or applies
the excess to reduce its annual compliance level or satisfy its remaining obligations.
75. See O'Neil, Site Visits at 21 Hill-Burton Facilities Reveal Extensive Non-Compliance, 16
CLaEOANGHOUSE REV. 404 (1982). In this study, site visits were made by Legal Assistance of
North Dakota to 21 Hill-Burton facilities between February and June of 1981.
76. See id. at 406-07.
77. Of 21 facilities visited, 15 either had no Hill-Burton journal or used an incomplete journal.
Nine of the 21 had eligibility determination forms that regularly lacked the information
required by the Hill-Burton regulations, or that failed to indicate changes in eligibility and
amounts of Hill-Burton coverage in cases in which an eligibility determination was initially
made and later reversed. See id. at 410.
78. 42 C.F.R. § 124.510(a)(1)(ii)(A) (1986) provides: "If the facility determines that in the
preceding fiscal year it did not provide uncompensated services at the annual compliance
level, it shall submit a report in the fiscal year in which the deficit is determined."
79. Inaccuracies were found in the free-care figures supplied by the hospitals. See O'Neil, supra
note 75, at 410.
80. The amount of the Hill-Burton deficit incurred by the hospitals, $63,478, represented 43.9
percent of the total amount of Hill-Burton care provided by these facilities in fiscal year
1980. Id. at 411.
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of error at ten of the facilities ranged from $439 to $17,900.81 Assuming
the report reflects nationwide levels of noncompliance, indigent patients
are denied millions of dollars in free health care yearly.82 Even the
burdens imposed by the 1979 regulations have failed to insure compli-
ance. The reluctance to comply with the Act means the people most
desperately in need of health care have one less source from which to
obtain it.
Many, if not most, Hill-Burton facilities do not provide the req-
uisite amount of free health care to the poor. The question remains
whether Hill-Burton should be used to provide free health care to the
poor. The argument against the provision of free health care centers
on a reading of the Act as providing only for the construction of health
care facilities. 83 At least one critic of the regulations argues that the
original language of the Act is distinguishable from the highly regulatory
nature that the free-health-care assurances have assumed.14 The Act was
not meant to solve the problem of lack of health care for the indigent,
nor was it meant to be a "mini-Medicaid" program. 5 It was intended
to provide facilities so that all people, including the indigent, could
enjoy better and more frequent health care.86 It was the reluctance of
hospitals to provide a reasonable volume of free health care that
necessitated the regulations.
The Constitutional Challenges
Many of the challenges to the regulations center on the holding of
Pennhurst v. Halderman.8 7 Pennhurst addressed the question of whether
a new federal statute, the "bill of rights" provision of the Develop-
81. Id. at 413. The study set up a chart of 10 of the facilities, their compliance levels, the
amount of free care provided in 1980 and the site visit error correction. Site visit error
correction amounts involve corrections in both the amounts facilities were obligated to offer
(compliance level) and the amounts they claimed to have provided as Hill-Burton care (their
Hill-Burton credits). Correction amounts involve corrections made in more than one fiscal
year under the current regulations for some facilities.
82. Assuming that all of the approximately 7,000 facilities aided by Hill-Burton failed to meet
their 1980 obligations by the same amount as the 11 hospitals studied, the loss would be
well over $40 million. This is a conservative estimate, since North Dakota is sparsely
populated. North Dakota ranked 46th in population in 1980, with a population of 653,000.
By comparison, California ranked first in population at 23,668,000. See BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:
1986 at 10-11 (106th ed. 1985).
83. See, e.g., Note, supra note 8, at 1475. The author argues that Hill-Burton was designed only
to deal with the construction of hospitals and related facilities and not to serve as a small-
scale national health insurance program. She separates the provision of physical facilities for
furnishing adequate health services from the provision of the services themselves.
84. Id. at 1478. The author concedes that Congress intended grantee hospitals to devote some
of its resources to providing free care, but argues that this does not justify the complex
nature of the regulations.
85. See Blumstein, supra note 9, at 1244; Note, supra note 8, at 1475.
86. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
87. 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
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mentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 8 conferred an
enforceable substantive right upon mentally retarded persons.8 9 The
Supreme Court held that the provision created no substantive rights to
"appropriate treatment" in the "least restrictive" environment. 90
The Court noted that legislation enacted pursuant to Congress'
spending power is much in the nature of a contract-in return for
federal funds, states agree to comply with federally imposed condi-
tions. 91 For legislative power to be legitimate, states must voluntarily
accept the terms of the contract. 92 There cannot be a knowing acceptance
if the state is unaware of the conditions or is unable to ascertain what
is expected of it.93 If Congress intends to impose conditions upon the
granting of funds, it must do so unambiguously. 94
As a result of the decision, in the absence of clear notice, "the
Court will not impose onerous financial obligations on federal grantees
after-the-fact." 95 Under this rationale, if the hospitals could prove that
the advocates for indigent plaintiffs were reading too much into the
legislative history or that the regulations impaired the contract rights
of the defendant hospitals, they could have the regulations struck.
A plaintiff used the contract theory in American Hospital Asso-
ciation v. Schweiker.96 In this case, the plaintiff sued on behalf of
hospitals receiving funds under Hill-Burton to have regulations that
impose community-service and uncompensated-care obligations declared
invalid, arguing that they violated statutory, contractual and constitu-
tional rights. 97
88. 42 U.S.C. § 6010(1)-(2) (1982). The Act established a federal-state grant program whereby
the federal government provides financial assistance to participating states to aid them in
creating programs to care for and treat the developmentally disabled. The "bill of rights"
provision states that mentally retarded persons have a right to appropriate treatment, services,
and habilitation in the setting that is least restrictive of personal liberty.
89. 451 U.S. at 5.
90. The Court examined the legislative history and found that it "buttresses . . .[the] conclusion
that Congress intended to encourage, rather than mandate, the provision of better services
to the developmentally disabled." Id. at 20.
The purpose of Hill-Burton in funding hospital construction was to insure that all people
of the state would have adequate health and hospital service. Legislators did not intend Hill-
Burton to "encourage" the provision of health care; rather Congress intended it to mandate
the provision of adequate health care to all people who used the federally funded facility.
This includes those who are unable to pay.
91. Id. at 17.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. By insisting that Congress speak clearly, the Court enables states to realize the conse-
quences of their participation in such programs as Hill-Burton.
95. Id. at 25.
96. 721 F.2d 170 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 958 (1984).
97. The American Hospital Association argued that the 1979 regulations exceed the Secretary's
statutory authority, that they violate contractual agreements between the federal government
and the hospitals by altering and expanding their obligations under those agreements, and
that they violate the due process clause by impairing the hospitals' contractual rights. 721
F.2d at 175, 182.
What is particularly interesting, and a bit ironic, is that none of the challenges made to
Hill-Burton attacked funding for modernization. The modernization of hospitals was not the
concern of the Hill-Burton Act; its concern was the construction of facilities. Despite this,
a complaint has yet to be raised that modernization funds were outside the original scope
of the Act and, as such, should have been eliminated.
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The court rejected the contract theory, noting that Title XVI
mandates the Secretary of Health and Human Services to prescribe the
manner in which all recipients of aid shall be required to comply with
the assurances given at the time the assistance was received. 98 The court
determined that the Secretary was acting within the scope of his
statutory mandate in promulgating the regulations. 9
In dealing with the impairment of contractual obligations claim,
the court found that a grant-in-aid program, such as Hill-Burton, was
within Congress' spending power. m00 The court also dismissed the ar-
gument that the hospitals were unsure of their obligations under the
Act. 101 They found that the conditions were unambiguously stated'0 2
and that the applicants had signed a very open-ended contract, one
which conferred a great deal of discretion upon the Secretary to define
the measure of their obligations under it.103 In Wyoming Hospital
Association v. Harris,"04 the court of appeals agreed with the rationale
of Schweiker and upheld the requirements. 05
THE PROPOSED REVISIONS
The Department of Health and Human Services proposed revisions
to the regulations. 0 6 These revisions are an attempt to lessen the
98. Id. at 174. In 1975, Hill-Burton was amended by Title XVI of the Public Health Service
Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300q et seq.; it provides for assurances similar to those in Title
VI; but adds teeth to the requirements. Title XVI mandates, rather than permits, the Secretary
to prescribe by regulation the manner in which all recipients of aid under either Title VI or
Title XVI shall be required to comply with the assurances given at the time such assistance
was received and the means by which the hospital will be required to demonstrate compliance
with such assurances. See 42 U.S.C. § 300s(3) (1982). The Secretary is also given extensive
investigative and enforcement powers by Title XVI. See 42 U.S.C. § 300s-6 (1982).
99. Id. at 176.
100. Id. at 182-83 ("The government acts by inducing a state or private party to cooperate with
the federal policy by conditioning receipt of federal aid upon compliance by the recipient
with federal statutory and administrative directives").
101. Id. at 183. The contracts contained general statements of the requirements and of the
statutory obligation imposed by 42 U.S.C. § 291c(e).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 184.
104. 727 F.2d 936 (10th Cir. 1984).
105. In this case, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief from enforcement of the
Hill-Burton regulations. The court held that the Secretary's decision to limit the uncompen-
sated care credit was rationally based and within his discretion. Id. at 940.
Other recent cases have followed the same rationale. In Intermountain Health Care
Hosp. Inc. v. Board of Comm'rs, 108 Idaho 136, 697 P.2d 1150 (1985), rev'd on other
grounds, 108 Idaho 757, 702 P.2d 795 (1985), the court stated simply: "[W]e note at the
outset that, as a recipient of federal funds under the Hill-Burton Act . . . the hospital has
obligated itself to provide a certain level and amount of care to the medically indigent." 697
P.2d at 1158. In John Muir Memorial Hosp. Inc. v. Davis, 559 F. Supp. 1042 (N.D. Cal.
1983), aff'd, 726 F.2d 1443 (9th Cir. 1983), the court held that "once a hospital accepts a
Hill-Burton grant, it is legally bound to provide free health care and may be penalized for
its failure to do so." 559 F. Supp. at 1044. Finally, in Metropolitan Medical Center and
Extended Care Facility v. Harris, 693 F.2d 775 (8th Cir. 1982), the court examined the
legislative history of Hill-Burton and concluded that Congress intended that Hill-Burton
hospitals devote some of their own resources to the poor. Id. at 785.
106. 51 Fed. Reg. 31,000 (1986) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. subpart F) (proposed Aug. 29,
1986).
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administrative burden of compliance for facilities, while increasing
incentive for compliance by facilities in order to protect the interests
of the intended beneficiaries of the uncompensated-services assurance.' °7
If these proposals are implemented, not only would the administrative
burden on the facilities be lessened, but the already low level of
compliance by these facilities would sink even lower.
Under the proposed rules, a facility in substantial compliance with
the regulations would receive credit for its compliance. 108 Substantial
compliance, however, is not a defined term under the regulations.
Additionally, the facility would be given credit if it had substantially
complied with the rules "despite aberrations on individual accounts."' 9
Litigation about what constitutes substantial compliance would be sure
to follow any challenge to a facility's level of compliance. The imple-
mentation of a substantial compliance standard would merely shift the
financial burden on Health and Human Services from the cost of
auditing to the cost of litigation.
Another disturbing proposal would implement the concept of jus-
tifiable deficits." 0 This concept would include the situation in which a
facility could show that there existed a lack of eligible applicants for
uncompensated services during the fiscal year."' This proposal would
face the same inherent problem that plagued the open-door compliance
level:"' there would be no way to monitor it effectively. If a facility
claimed there was a lack of eligible applicants, Health and Human
Services would be hard pressed to refute that claim, especially since the
proposed rules would greatly relax reporting requirements."'
Another proposed change would allow facilities to hire an inde-
pendent auditor to determine the amount of creditable uncompensated
services provided." 4 The danger of an independent audit is that there
would be tremendous incentive to bribery or payoff to alter the records
kept by the facility. This danger could be largely circumvented by
requiring Health and Human Services to perform the audit." 5
Finally, the proposed rules would eliminate the requirement under
the current regulations that facilities send reports to the health systems
agency in their area." '6 The rationale advanced for this change is that
the requirement is unnecessary, since facilities are not required to
107. Health and Human Services noted that the existing regulations rely on strict adherence to
procedural requirements, and believes that a relaxing of the regulations would make it easier
on hospitals and stimulate compliance. Id. at 31,001.
108. See proposed § 124.511(b)(1), 51 Fed. Reg. 31,010-11.
109. Id. at 31,004.
110. Id. at 31,002.
Ill. See proposed § 124.503(b)(1), 51 Fed. Reg. 31,007.
112. See supra note 72.
113. See id. at 31,001.
114. See proposed § 124.511(b)(1)(ii), 51 Fed. Reg. 31,011. The only effort by Health and Human
Services to monitor the audit procedures is to "make guidance materials available." Id. at
31,004.
115. See Appendix, proposed addition to § 124.511(a)(1).
116. This requirement is currently codified in subsections of 42 C.F.R. § 124.510 (1986).
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implement recommendations that they may receive from the health
systems agency." 7 The elimination of this requirement would simply
mean that there would be one less source available to detect noncom-
pliance.
Although many of the proposed rules are beneficial, any changes
made to the regulations should demand strict adherence to procedural
requirements. Allowing for substantial compliance, independent audits,
justifiable deficits and the elimination of reporting requirements hardly
provides incentive for compliance. If the interests of the intended
beneficiaries of uncompensated care are truly the concern of Health
and Human Services, then more stringent requirements should be im-
plemented.
A PROPOSED SOLUTION TO THE ENFORCEMENT PROBLEM
Despite the plaintive cries of hospitals receiving Hill-Burton funds,
courts have found an affirmative duty to provide free health care. This
has not, however, had much of an effect on hospitals around the
country. Instead of providing required health care, they defer satisfac-
tion of their uncompensated health care obligation, theoretically into
eternity." 8 Although this benefits the hospitals, it leaves the indigent
without the health care to which they are entitled.
Two proposals would increase compliance. The first of the changes
would be to establish a small auditing team within Health and Human
Services that would conduct nationwide site checks." 9 The North Dakota
study shows that site checks can detect noncompliance) 20 Although
auditors could only study a limited number of facilities each year, the
threat of being audited would make hospital administrators more con-
scious of Hill-Burton obligations. 2 ,
The second proposal incorporates the first into the regulatory frame-
work of the Act. The proposal consists of two amendments to 42 C.F.R.
§ 124.511.122 The first amendment involves investigation of compliance
by the Secretary of Health and Human Services. 23 This addition to the
117. 51 Fed. Reg. 31,004-05.
118. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. A facility can make up its deficit at any time
during its period of obligation or in the years following, if necessary, unless the facility
failed to provide uncompensated services at the required level when they were financially
capable of doing so. As the Legal Assistance of North Dakota study indicates, hospitals
frequently overstate the amount of services they provided. Unless an audit is performed, it
appears as though the hospital is in compliance.
119. This proposal is in accordance with 42 C.F.R. § 124.511 (1986), which gives enforcement
authority to the federal government. This proposal also retains the option of state reporting
and enforcement requirements under § 124.512.
120. See supra notes 75-82 and accompanying text.
121. The emphasis should center on facilities whose 20-year obligation is about to expire. The
number of obligated hospitals drops yearly. If audits were centered on those facilities about
to be discharged, detection of noncompliance would extend their obligations, rather than
grant the discharge, thus maximizing the amount of services available to the indigent.
122. See Appendix, proposed amendments to § 124.511.
123. 42 C.F.R. § 124.511(a)(1) (1986) currently provides:
(a) Investigations. (1) The Secretary periodically investigates the compliance of facilities
with the requirements of this subpart, and investigates complaints.
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section mandates an audit of Hill-Burton facilities to determine compli-
ance. By mandating an audit, the proposal would require the Secretary
to seek out noncompliance rather than wait for complaints. The second
amendment involves the enforcement of the regulations by the Secre-
tary.'2 It provides for a financial penalty if a facility fails to keep records
as required by the regulations.1 25 The North Dakota study indicates that
poor record keeping is commonplace amongst recipient hospitals. 126 This
amendment provides incentive to recipient hospitals to keep accurate,
up-to-date records on compliance. 27 In addition, it helps to alleviate cost
concerns that critics might have. 28
CONCLUSION
Although Hill-Burton has been successful at building medical facil-
ities across the country, hospitals still fail to provide free health care to
those most desperately in need of it. Hospitals have shown they will not
comply with targets if left to their own devices. Hill-Burton should not
be used as a Medicaid program. However, since hospitals have accepted
funding from the federal government, they should at least comply with
the conditions attached to the funding. Recent Health and Human
Services proposals will most likely discourage compliance, and will make
it easier for hospitals to avoid their Hill-Burton obligation. Health and
Human Services should promulgate more stringent regulations such as
those suggested here to compel Hill-Burton hospitals to provide the free
health care that they promised when they received funding.
Paul D. Lochner*
124. 42 C.F.R. § 124.511(b)(1) (1986) currently provides:
(b) Enforcement. (1) If the Secretary finds, based on his investigation under paragraph
(a) of this section, that a facility did not comply with the requirements of this subpart,
he may take any action authorized by law to secure compliance, including but not
limited to voluntary agreement or a request to the Attorney General to bring an action
against the facility for specific performance.
125. The proposed addition requires that any facility whose records are not in compliance be
required to pay the reasonable cost of the audit to Health and Human Services. This should
not be viewed as a penalty, but rather as compensation for the cost of straightening out the
records that the facility is required to keep under § 124.510. See Appendix, proposed addition
to § 124.511(b)(1).
Since facilities are required to keep these records, any challenge made to this proposal
on the grounds of impairment of contract or due process would likely be unsuccessful. As
the court in American Hosp. Ass'n v. Schweiker, 721 F.2d 170 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
466 U.S. 958 (1984) noted, any challenge to regulations promulgated by the Secretary of
Health and Human Services must show that the regulations are "arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion or not in accordance with the law." 721 F.2d 170 at 175. The standard
is one of deference; the decision of the agency will be affirmed if it has any rational basis.
Id. at 175-76.
126. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
127. Under this proposal, if a facility is audited, and it is discovered that its records are complete
and properly kept and that the facility is in compliance with the Act, the cost of the audit
is absorbed by the federal government. See Appendix, proposed addition to § 124.511(b)(1).
128. The proposal would need initial funding from Health and Human Services, but the cost to
the government would be reimbursed by any facility not in compliance with the record
keeping requirements of the regulations. If the North Dakota study is any indicator, cost to
the government would be negligible.
* A.B., University of Michigan, 1984; J.D. Candidate, Notre Dame Law School, 1987.
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APPENDIX
PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO § 124.511
Add to (a)(1):
The periodic investigation performed by the Secretary shall consist of an audit of
the records that each facility is required to keep under this subpart.
Add to (b)(1):
If the Secretary finds, based on an audit of a facility that 1) the facility did not
keep records as required under this subpart, or 2) that the records are inaccurate, in-
complete or otherwise not in compliance with this subpart, the facility shall be required
to reimburse Health and Human Services for the reasonable costs of the audit performed.
